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Abstract. This note looks at insurance of minor, recurrent losses.
The main concern is with eﬃciency properties of full coverage. As motivation
and running example we concider a regime, currently operative in several Eu-
ropean countries, that oﬀers employees complete wage reimbursement during
short spell sickness. Assembled here are some arguments speaking against this
sort of insurance policy.
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1. Introduction
Suppose your bicycle repeatedly is stolen and never recovered. To protect yourself
against that recurrent and notable, yet minor loss, you might arrange ex ante for
complete indemnity. Indeed, full theft insurance is available in some bicycle shops.
Should you reasonably buy it?
Similarly, a ﬂue might occasionally constrain you to stay brieﬂya w a yf r o mw o r k .
Should you - or your employer or society at large - then have secured you full reim-
bursement of the resulting wage loss? Such insurance were indeed provided in the
former Soviet Union, and it remains a part of social security in several European
countries (including Denmark, Germany and Norway1). Clearly, so extreme a policy
aﬀects supply, demand and productivity of labor - as well as incentives.
In these and similar cases there are ample reasons to inquire about insurance, its
appropriateness and impacts. In particular, what does full coverage indicate about
the so-called loading factor on the premium? How does such a policy fare in terms
of risk sharing? Why is there no coinsurance? What does insisting on no deductible
imply in terms of risk aversion? Will the policy provide eﬃcient mutual insurance?
Are worries about hazard well accounted for?
Concerning these and other questions I assemble some observations, each casting
doubts on the eﬃciency of full insurance. The arguments are simple, but ought not
be overlooked. Few of the results collected below are original. Most are well known,
but scattered in the literature. Therefore a main motive for this note is simply to
assemble them.
∗University of Bergen and Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; e-mail:
sjur.ﬂaam@econ.uib.no. Thanks for support are due CES, Ruhrgas, Røwdes fond and Meltzers
høyskolefond. This paper was drafted during a visit to CES in Munich.
1The Norwegian regime as of Jan. 21, 2002 gives the employee the right to be absent 8 consequtive
days from work, maintaining full wage, without a doctor’s certiﬁcation of illness. Such absence can
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2. Is Full Coverage Reasonable?
How will a risk averse agent behave when oﬀered full insurance? Mossin (1968) al-
ready addressed that issue:
Proposition 1. (On purchase of full insurance)
(i) If the agent is strictly risk averse, he is willing to pay more than the actuarial
value of full insurance.
(ii) If moreover, his absolute risk aversion decreases, his willingness to pay decreases
as he becomes more wealthy.
(iii) However, only if the loading factor on the insurance premium is ≤ 0, will he
purchase full cover.
Concerning (i), it appears safe to assume typical agents strictly risk averse regarding
even minor economic losses. One may expect them to demand some insurance, albeit
not full coverage, and maybe less as they become better oﬀ. Concerning (ii) and (iii),
the fact that unions of workers - whose members have become more prosperous -
insist on complete reimbursement of minor wage losses suggests presence of subsidies.
3. Is the Risk Sharing Efficient?
In general it seems prudent that contracting parties agree on eﬃcient arrangements.
Eﬃciency here simply means that they underwrite a treaty which leaves no room for
improving the lot of one party without inﬂicting losses on the other.
In our context suppose an insurance policy is agreed upon which stipulates indem-
nity I(x) to be paid by the employer to the employee in case of wage loss x. The ﬁrst
party (the employer) has wealth W, utility function U(·), and receives a premium π
from the second who holds wealth w and utility function u(·). For good and obvious
reasons I tacitly assume that 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x - and that any utility function be smooth
and strictly monotone. Suppose moreover that U00(·) and u00(·) < 0. This last assump-
tion is reasonable: It simply says that both parties are strictly risk averse (although
maybe moderately so). Eﬃciency then entails existence of a positive constant µ such
that, modulo that number, marginal utilities are equal:
U
0(W + π − I(x)) = µu
0(w − π − x + I(x)) for all x. (1)
Proposition 2. (Risk sharing and coinsurance [15].2) It follows from (1) that
0 <I 0(x) < 1 Thus concerns with eﬃciency imply some degree and form of coinsur-
ance. 2
Full cover for short spell sickness (henceforth SSS) is certainly not up to that stan-
dard. But I(x)=x becomes, of course, explicable by assigning no welfare weight
to the employer. Absent dictatorial power to the proletariat, such rulings are hardly
defendable.
2O n ec o u l dp o s i t ,q u i t er e a s o n a b l y ,t h a tno loss yields no indemnity, i.e. I(0) = 0, to have
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Proposition 2 advocates that partial self-insurance had better be built into a
good policy. Speciﬁcally, it seems reasonable that the insured agent fully covers
a ﬁrst, lower part of the risk. He would then hold a cap-loss policy of the type
I(x)=m a x {x − D,0} where D>0 is a so-called deductible. A problem appears
here though: The cap-loss format violates the above result 0 <I 0(x) < 1. Operating
expenses change the picture, however. As seen next, they will set things right:
4 . S h o u l dt h e r eb eaD e d u c t i b l e ?
Some existing insurance policies for SSS oﬀer full coverage, no coinsurance, and no
deductible. Can such policies reasonably be justiﬁed? What attitudes do they dis-
play? Arrow [1] proved the following
Proposition 3. (Coverage only above a deductible) If any insurance policy is avail-
able at a premium which depends merely on its actuarial value, then it becomes optimal
for a risk-averse buyer to secure himself cover - and in fact, full cover - of own loss
only above a deductible minimum. 2
Thus the agent takes full self-insurance up to a deductible D.3 Drèze [6] related
D to the so-called loading factor l>0 and to the agent’s relative risk aversion R.
His analysis provided the following bound and insights:4
Proposition 4. (Bounds on relative risk aversion) Consider a risk-averse agent with
smooth concave utility function u(·) and wealth w, who faces risk X, and who can get
cap-loss indemnity I(X): =m a x{X − D,0} at a premium π = π(EI)=π(D) which
depends only on the actuarial value EI(X). Let the threshold Y := w−π−D denote
his income after deduction D. Then the relative risk aversion R(Y ) is bounded below

















3Related studies include [6], [9], [10], [8], [17], [18], [21]
4Relative to the threshold income Y := w − π − D Dreze used the approximation
u0(w − π − x) ≈ u0(Y ) − (x − D)u00(Y )
for the domain x ≤ D. Closer inspection reveals that the inequality
u0(w − π − x) ≥ u0(Y ) − (x − D)u00(Y )
suﬃces in that domain. But the last inequality is satisﬁed automatically for a concave smooth u(·).Full Coverage for Minor, Recurrent Losses? 4
Consequently, a choice D =0would reﬂect inﬁnite relative risk aversion - or equiv-
alently, zero risk tolerance - on the part of the buyer. 2
Ic o n c l u d e :Full wage reimbursement during SSS reﬂects that workers are inﬁnitely
risk averse. Equivalently, they have no risk tolerance whatsoever when it comes
to wage loss of short duration.
Such attitudes appear neither reasonable nor plausible. Full cover can hardly
be justiﬁed by commonly observed risk attitudes. Could it be then, that suitable
justiﬁcation comes in terms of other non-insurable risk? I doubt it. Nonetheless, I
shall pursue that argument next.
5. Should The Value of Leisure be insured?
Given the prevalence of insurance loading (l>0),a n dt h ef a c tt h a ti n s u r a n c et y p i c a l l y
generates administrative costs, why do we still observe contracts with complete cover?
Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) found that presence of a supplementary, non-
insurable risk might induce risk-averse agents to arrange for full indemnity even at
an actuarially unfair tariﬀ. Intuitively, this result hinges upon a positive association
between two types of risks: one insurable, the other non-insurable.
A standard example comes with an employer who may loose more than his (pre-
sumably insurable) opportunity cost when sick and absent. The productivity of his
employees is then likely to be lower, and that loss can hardly be covered by insurance.5
Now, what about similar short-term absence among employees? Besides the in-
sured risk, do they face other positively correlated, non-insurable risks that could jus-
tify full cover of the insurable one?
As said, the basic insurable risk is here the worker’s wage loss, stemming from
short-duration sickness (and resulting absence from paid work). Such sickness comes
in diverse degrees of severity, however, ranging from light indisposure to full work-
inability. If the agent is only mildly hit, his value of attending leisure remains positive.
The worker is thus, in principle and reality, exposed to a composed, two-stage risk:
First, he may fall sick and thereby, if absent from work without insurance, loose
his salary. Second, during work absence his illness may block desirable, alternative
activities and aﬀect the value of his leisure.6
To formalize the situation, suppose a worker enjoys smooth, strictly increasing,
strictly concave utility u(r) of his monetary revenue r. When working, he receives




x>0 with probability pS > 0
0 with probability 1 − pS.
The part I(X) ∈ [0,X] of that loss can be recompensed via insurance, available at
premium π =( 1+l)pS per unit covered. As above, l is the loading factor.I tu s u a l l y
5This simple observation prompts an immediate question: Why are employers not oﬀered insur-
ance for SSS?
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is positive and reﬂects the costs of the insurance provider.
Leisure tends to have positive monetary value. However, when a worker is forced
by accidental illness to stay brieﬂy away from paid work, most likely his value of
leisure is less than usual. One can hardly exclude though that occasionally, in some
situations, a positive beneﬁt accrues to the unfortunate, sick worker. That beneﬁt
may then be seen as a partial recompense for bad luck. I shall model this feature
by introducing uncertainty about the economic value L of leisure as perceived during
sickness and/or absence from paid work. Speciﬁcally, let
L :=
½
L>0 with probability pL > 0
0 with probability 1 − pL.
The risk (lottery) L is here seen as non-insurable. I naturally posit that w>L .As
usual, rational purchase of insurance assumes the form of optimization:
maximize Eu(w − πI − X + L+I(X)) subject to I(X) ∈ [0,X].
Four scenarios must be kept in mind here. These correspond to which - or how many -
risks have materialized. Their nature and probabilities are spelled out in the following
table:
scen (X,L) wage without insur. wage with insur. probability
1:( 0 ,0) ww − πI 1 − pS − pL + pSpL|S
2:( x,0) w − xw − πI − x + Ip S(1 − pL|S)
3:( 0 ,L) ww − πIp L − pSpL|S
4:( x,L) w − x + Lw − πI − x + L + Ip SpL|S
For simplicity let ps,u s,u 0
s denote the probability, the utility, and the marginal utility,
respectively in state (or scenario) s =1 ,...,4. To ﬁnd a most desirable indemnity
schedule I(·) amounts a priori to
maximize Eu = p1u1 + ···+ p4u4 with respect to I(X) ∈ [0,X].
For the argument assume that full cover I = x is optimal. One may then argue that7







when I = S. (2)
7For completeness the argument, also found in Henriet & Rochet (1991) is reproduced here: Since
the objective is concave, full cover is optimal iﬀ ∂
∂IEu|I=x ≥ 0, that is, iﬀ
−p1u0
1π + p2u0
2(1 − π) − p3u0
3π + p4u0
4(1 − π) ≥ 0 when I = x.
I = x yields u0
1 = u0
2 = u0
3. Therefore the preceding inequality amounts to
£




4(1 − π) ≥ 0 when I = x,








when I = x,
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Note that u0
2 >u 0
4 and pL|S >p 4. Therefore (2) implies l<0 whence
Proposition 5. (Partial insurance of SSS). Suppose SSS occasionally provides a
positive monetary value of associated leisure; that is, suppose pL|S > 0 with L>0.
Then the loading l of insurance premium must be negative to justify full cover for
short-term sickness.8 2
Proposition 5 indicates (together with Proposition 1) that employees, or their unions,
regard SSS insurance as subsidized by the public sector - or, if not, it ought be so.
I conclude on the coupling between work and leisure by mentioning a fairly extreme
case. Suppose someone - say, a young man - enjoys so robust and perfect health that
his risk of SSS is negligible during a speciﬁed period. Suppose also that the same
person then faces great uncertainty (or simply large variability) in the monetary
value L of his leisure. Being guaranteed take-home wage w he obtains on the average
Eu(max{w,L}). Thus, while intending to insure his labor income, one has in fact
insured the value of his leisure. Admittedly this is a peculiar arrangement and hardly
justiﬁable. To reinforce the absurdity, suppose the person at hand is risk neutral with
respect to income. He then obtains a payoﬀ (or utility) max{w,L} which is convex
in L. For that reason he would be willing to pay for increased uncertainty. A fortiori,
he would hesitate in joining a mutual insurance company. Other workers, of more
common sort, might want to join. Why and how?
6. Does Constant Coverage fit Mutual Insurance?
Many workers are members of a productive cooperative. (Others could, at least ideo-
logically, be conceived of as such.) Random ﬂuctuations in factor availability (includ-
ing labor) are then problematic for their joint enterprise. For mitigation the members
could pool their resources. Pooling must be generated and upheld by compensations
(side payments). For its viability the underlying scheme had better be eﬃcient, in-
centive compatible, and ”equitable”. To serve these ends cooperative game theory
advocates that a so-called core solution be implemented. Such a solution amounts
to specify individual compensations that induce overall eﬃciency and encourage no
party to protest.
Now, in mutual insurance, what determines a core solution? In essence only two
things: ﬁrst, the aggregate (pooled) risk; and second, the ”aggregate”, ”representa-
tive” (pooled or convoluted) preference; see [2], [3], [12], [14]. Broadly speaking, the
worker (or employer) who with relative ease can assume risk will do so and thereby
be compensated. If the pool members diﬀer in risks and attitudes, their sharing will
neither be uniform nor egalitarian. And most important: if some risk still remains
in the aggregate, it will not be eliminated at the individual level.
I conclude that an insurance policy for SSS which oﬀers the same, stable indem-
nity to everybody, irrespective of aggregate risk, violates one or more respectable
8Note that this claim did not presume any sort of correlation between the two risks. The reason
is that increased value of leisure has no consequence when at work (scenario s =3 ) .Full Coverage for Minor, Recurrent Losses? 7
conditions: It is ineﬃcient, or it leaves some group worse oﬀ than alone.
The ﬁrst defect is worrisome, but concerning the last one might simply say: The
purpose of social security is solidarity and assistance. Consequently, fortunate groups
should not be allowed to defect. I have, of course, much sympathy for this objection.
It appears however, somewhat misplaced here. Solidarity works best for major risks,
little aﬀected by moral hazard or adverse selection. Short spell sickness is, almost by
deﬁnition, a minor risk - and certainly not immune to hidden action or information.
Anyway, the issue of solidarity touches on how risks should be pooled. So let us
consider that issue.
7. Pooling across Persons or Periods?
Insurance relies, both in theory and practice, on two chief results of probability the-
ory, namely: the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem [11]. Crucial
for the validity and applicability of these results is the independence (or quite weak
association) of the intervening risks. Broadly speaking, independence (or weak cor-
relation) ensures that aggregate risks are less variable than their constituent terms
might indicate. Aggregation and averaging then applies to the entire pool of risk
holders.
Probability theory points however, to another average, namely that taken over
time. Under fairly weak conditions, called ergodicity - and apparently satisﬁed in the
case of SSS - the two procedures are equivalent [22]:
Proposition 7. (Equivalence of population and time averages) Consider a popu-
lation that is homogenous with respect to productivity and SSS. Denote by S a ﬁnite
but exhaustive set of possible states s regarding SSS. Suppose any agent, if today in
state s ∈ S, will tomorrow reach state s0 ∈ S with positive probability pss0. Then there
is a unique steady-state distribution over the population. It is described by the relative
frequencies πs of various states, as the only non-negative solution of
X
s∈S





For any state-dependent wage system ws, s ∈ S, cum indemnity minus premium, and





πsws =l i m
T→+∞
ws(1) + ···+ ws(T)
T
. 2
This says result that, within a homogenous risk class the frequencies of diverse, rele-
vant events over the population coincide with those of a representative risk over time.
In other words: Cross sections and time averages are equal. Consequently, for small
recurrent risks the agent can ”pool with himself.” He transfers thereby money from
happy, sunny days to less amusing, rainy days. Instruments for doing so abound.
They are usually grouped under the heading of precautionary savings.Full Coverage for Minor, Recurrent Losses? 8
8. Possibilities for Arbitrage?
As is well known, and increasingly visible, there are close connections between insur-
ance and ﬁnance. Both ﬁelds provide instruments for reallocating wealth or claims
across states and times. A fundamental concept in ﬁnance, simpler than the notion
of equilibrium, is that of arbitrage [13]. This phenomenon refers to ﬁnancial possibil-
ities of making guaranteed pure proﬁt. Clearly, no well-functioning ﬁnancial market
- and no viable institution - could oﬀer such opportunities for extended periods.
Bankruptcy would soon ensue somewhere.
The most simple instance of arbitrage involves merely two papers: one always
yields lower net dividend than the other. If so, one had better sell the ﬁrst paper and
use the proceeds to buy the second. In ﬁnancial jargon the advice is to take a short
position in the ﬁrst to ﬁnance a corresponding long position in the second.
Does this elementary recipe apply to full insurance for SSS? I think it does! One
”paper” is to receive wage compensation for the disutility and eﬀo r tt h a tm i g h tg o
along with work. The alternative option is to receive the same wage, be relieved of
work disutility and enjoy some leisure. If not subject to moral inhibition or social
disapproval, the latter choice appears most attractive in any state of health. Con-
sequently, some employees are likely to exploit such arbitrage opportunities to the
full. When their behavior eventually becomes widely adopted, and maybe acquires
the status of a tacit convention, deliberate absence will only be limited by imposed
bounds. Competent workers become rational shirkers. We face a problem referred to
as moral hazard.
9. Is Asymmetric Information accounted for?
Asymmetric information usually causes problems for eﬃcient insurance. These stem
from adverse selection or moral hazard. Problems of this type occur when unobserv-
able properties or actions aﬀect economic outcomes.[20] For our example, sometimes
others cannot ascertain whether a worker shirks - or has pursued activities which
rendered him temporarily less ﬁt for work. Therefore, to induce care and eﬀort the
employer might reasonably apply tariﬀs that incorporate some degree of coinsurance.
Clearly, full reimbursement for SSS is at glaring variance with such arrangements.
Generally, asymmetric information may justify use of personal policies, typically
in the form of non-linear indemnity schedules. If so, workers will face a menu of
SSS policies, among which they can choose. Two features then appear fairly robust:
First, more comprehensive coverage comes at higher unitary premium; second, more
coverage will be demanded by riskier agents. Again: full, egalitarian, and uniform
reimbursement for SSS is markedly at odds with a composite menu.
The severity of asymmetric information is, of course, an empirical issue. While
contract theory has developed at rapid pace, it still comprises fairly few empirical
studies. As pointed out by Chiappori [4], asymmetric information implies positive
correlation between two conditional distributions. It seems therefore interesting to
relate SSS to weather, holidays, or jours de fetes. In short, there should be ample
possibilities of empirical work.Full Coverage for Minor, Recurrent Losses? 9
10. Concluding Remarks
Insurance of minor, recurrent losses (such as SSS) must be seen and evaluated from
three viewpoints. First, risk - when seen as a commodity, to be allocated over time
and contingencies - has some aspects of a private commodity. Second, there are
contractual arrangements worthy of investigation as such. Third, one cannot avoid
questions about equity and solidarity. I shall conclude by brief elaboration of each of
these three aspects.
First, an insurance policy, in oﬀering contingent indemnities, may ﬁt the Arrow-
Debreu general notion of a private commodity traded in competitive equilibrium. Just
like ﬁnancial assets the underlying treaty transfers wealth across time and states.
T ot h ee x t e n tt h i sv i e wp o i n ti sﬁtting, it indicates that agents exposed to small,
infrequent, recurrent risks can tackle the related inconveniencies by precautionary
savings. The ergodic nature of the underlying phenomenon tells that time averages
serve the same purpose as population averages. In extremis, this speaks for self-
insurance. The problems with asymmetric information and incentives then become
less pressing.
Second, insurance treaties are contracts, written under asymmetrical information
and suﬀering from incompleteness. Therefore their design and implementation re-
mains a challenge and potentially, a source of dispute. Since insurance generally is
beset with moral hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection (hidden type), this last
view seems most appropriate. The Arrow-Debreu optic simply ignores these crucial
features. So, whether in theory or practice, the speciﬁc design of SSS insurance had
better rely on insights oﬀered by information economics and theories of contracts.
Those insights all stress the importance of risk sharing or coinsurance. I have in-
dicated here above that on major accounts full coverage falls signiﬁcantly short of
reasonable requirements.
Third, whether by intention or not, SSS insurance redistributes income across
various groups and risks. In that capacity it qualiﬁes as an object of scrutiny for the-
ories of social justice. Those theories apply at best though, to risks that aﬀect major
faculties and options [19]. It seems far from clear that short-spell work incapacity -
say, during a day or two - falls directly into such categories. At least one might beg
leave to doubt it.
References
[1] K. Arrow, Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care, The American
Economic Review 53, 941-969 (1963).
[2] B. Baton and J. Lemaire, The core or a reinsurance market, ASTIN Bulletin 12, 57-71
(1981).
[3] K. Borch, Equilibrium in a reinsurance market, Econometrica 30, 3, 230-250 (1962).
[4] P.-A. Chiappori, Econometric models of insurance and asymmetric information, in G.
Dionne (ed.) Handbook of Insurance, Kluwer (in press).Full Coverage for Minor, Recurrent Losses? 10
[5] N. A. Doherty and H. Schlesinger, Optimal insurance in incomplete markets, Journal
of Political Economy 91, 6, 1045-1054 (1983).
[6] J. H. Drèze, Inferring risk tolerance from deductibles in insurance contracts, The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 20, 48-52 (1981).
[7] J. H. Dreze, The role of securities and labor contracts in the optimal allocation of risk
bearing, in H. Louberge (ed.) Risk, Information and Insurance, Kluwer, Dordrecht
(1990).
[8] Y. M. Ermoliev and S. D. Flåm, Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts, to
appear in The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2002).
[9] C. Gollier, Pareto-optimal risk sharing with ﬁxed cost per claim, Scandinavian Actu-
arial Journal 13: 62-73 (1992).
[10] G. Huberman, D. Mayers, and C.W. Smith Jr., Optimal insurance indemnity schedules,
Bell Journal of Economic Theory 14: 415-426 (1983).
[11] D. Henriet and J.-C. Rochet, Microeconomie de l’assurance, Economica, Paris (1991).
[12] J. Lemaire, Borch’s theorem: a historical survey and applications, in H. Louberge (ed.)
Risk, Information and Insurance, Kluwer, Dordrecht (1990).
[13] S. F. LeRoy and J. Werner, Principles of Financial Economics, Cambridge University
Press (2001).
[14] M. Magill and M. Quinzii, Theory of Incomplete markets,M I TP r e s s ,C a m b r i d g e
(1996).
[15] D. Moﬀet, The risk sharing problem, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 11, 5-13
(1979).
[16] J. Mossin, Aspects of rational insurance purchasing, Journal of Political Economy 76,
4, 553-568 (1968).
[17] B. Pashigian, L. Schkade, and G. Menefee, The selection of an optimal deductible for
a given insurance policy, Journal of Business 39, 35-44 (1966).
[18] A. Raviv, The design of an optimal insurance policy, The American Economic Review
69, 1, 84-96 (1979).
[19] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Havard University Press (1971).
[20] B. Salanié, The Economics of Contracts, The MIT Press, Cambridge (1997).
[21] V. L. Smith, Optimal insurance coverage, Journal of Political Economy 76, 68-77
(1968).Full Coverage for Minor, Recurrent Losses? 11
[22] N. L. Stokey and R. E. Lucas Jr., Recursive Methods in Economics,H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t y
Press (1989).